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1. Introduction
Analogical reasoning is a ubiquitous process playing a pivotal role in many disparate
cognitive processes from induction, through metaphor interpretation, to creativity. We
examine the role of analogy in creative reasoning highlighting the many similarities between
both reasoning mechanisms. We interpret creativity as the search for some source analogue
with which to reinterpret a given target domain. Such a mapping has the attractive quality that
it explains anomalies in the current target interpretation. We have chosen as a basis for a
detailed examination, creativity within the science domain as we feel that this offers the best
opportunity for computational modelling.
To support creative reasoning we require great flexibility in the retrieval and mapping phases,
to support the formation of semantically distant mappings. However, this flexibility will
inevitably result in the generation of invalid analogies, which should be rejected as early in
the validation stage as possible. In this paper we focus on retrieval and mapping and
particularly their influence upon the validation mechanism. We also review previous work
which may be complementary to our retrieval, mapping and validation procedures.
While the full extent of creativity encompasses many domain specific processes beyond the
scope of analogy, we focus on processes related to background knowledge - or Long Term
Memory (LTM). We feel that an examination of the effects and influences of an LTM
provides some valuable insights into the analogical process, and thus creativity itself. The
overall aim of this paper then, is the development of a computational model capable of
supporting creative reasoning, and in pursuit of this goal we avail of previous work in the area
of analogical reasoning.
We feel that no stage of analogical reasoning or creativity may be adequately modelled free
from the influences of the other stages. Our integrated model examines analogy as a form of
memory embedded reasoning, and results directly from a holistic view of analogy. The
operation of each stage depends directly upon the information supplied by the preceding
stage, and on the underlying memory contents. Focusing on an individual stage eliminates the
influence of interactions between stages, significantly reducing the scope and complexity of
that individual stage. Furthermore, indirect interactions between non-sequential stages may
not be identified by the constrained models, such as the requirements placed upon retrieval by
the validation process..
We focus on scientific rather than artistic creativity because its well structured and
identifiable concept boundaries lend themselves more readily to computational modelling.
Secondly, scientific creativity generally addresses specific limitations with the accepted
understanding of some concept. Finally, an identified problem area can be used as a target
domain, serving as the basis for a search for a suitable source. Thus, we might utilise the
results of years of work in analogical reasoning to develop a useful model of this creative
process.
2. Creativity
True creativity is sometimes said to lie not in seeing new things, but in having new eyes.
Thus, we see the familiar afresh,  gaining a new understanding or appreciation of it. For
example, we might view a triangle as a planar object with three sides, or as a planar object
with three angles; with each interpretation highlighting different aspects of it. Scientific
creativity is required where existing analogies which are used to structure and understand
some domain, are found to have specific limitations. This identifies certain facts which lie
outside the existing understanding, as anomalous information within the general theory, if you
will. The current analogy lacks the descriptive power to cover all relevant factors of the
domain. Sometimes even, those factors which lie beyond the analogy are reasonably well
known in their own right. Kekulé’s original carbon chain analogy for example, explained
many molecular structure but couldn’t explain the structure of the C6H6 molecule. This was a
well documented molecule, but its observed behaviour was contradictory to that predicted by
the Carbon Chain analogy (which predicted a highly reactive substance due to all the unused
Carbon bonds). A new interpretation which resolved the apparent anomalies was required.
Creativity is usually examined as a search for inspiration, wherein we look for new analogies
with which to restructure or reinterpret old knowledge (Boden, 1994). Viewing sound as
waves upon the water or the heart as a pump introduces new ways of understanding old,
though ill-understood concepts. Hadamard described Creativity as being composed of the
following stages :
i) Preparation
ii) Incubation
iii) Illumination
iv) Verification
As we shall see, each of these stages has a parallel in Analogical Reasoning. We shall focus
on the incubation, illumination and verification phases, which we liken to the retrieval,
mapping, and validation phases of analogy. It is this similarity between analogy and creativity
which we use as the basis for a realisable computational model of creative reasoning.
There are a great number of possible source analogues which could have served as inspiration
for Kekulé’s carbon ring; from buckling his trouser belt in the morning, or repairing a bicycle
chain, to collaring his dog for a walk at night. We require a method of discovering the
required structural similarity between some problem domain and any appropriate source
domain. However, to achieve this we must also have a method of rejecting invalid source
domains, preferably with minimal computational expense. It is one of our basic premises that
not every domain which bears a structural similarity to a given target domain, can act as the
source of creative insight. Indeed, we partly adopt an opposite but complementary position;.
that is how do we identify source domains which although they have the required
systematicity, cannot support valid creative insight.
A source domain of six clouds could, conceivably, have served as Kekulé’s source of
inspiration, each cloud being mapped to a CH group (Figure 1), and the clouds then adopting
the appropriate formation. However, the source domain might also include information
whereby these clouds coalesce, forming one large cloud with the original entities vanishing in
favour of the new entity. Any attempt to transfer the “coalesce” predicate to the target should
result in the validation mechanism rejecting the inter-domain mapping. The coalesce
predicate could be rejected as any combination of the target atoms could not result in their
identities being lost. Coalesce would be restricted to mass nouns and the use of non-mass
nouns with this predicate would be trapped as a validation failure. This restriction on
predicate applicability applies not just to coalesce, but to all predicates. Differentiating
between useful and useless source analogues is a prime consideration of this paper.
 
Figure 1 : The Carbon Chain
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We now examine some existing models of analogical mapping, as it is this phase which is the
driving force behind structure based reasoning. This will serve to highlight the requirements
of the retrieval phase, while also determining the types of validation required once inter-
domain mappings have been generated.
3. Analogy Models for Creative Reasoning
Metaphor and analogy have been studied since the days of Aristotle, with Lakoff and
Johnston (1980) highlighting its ubiquity in cognition. It was Gentner’s (1983) identification
of the central role of the inter-domain mapping which sparked the development of
comprehensive computational models of this process. These models take domains represented
by predicate calculus assertions, and attempted to identify the best set of 1-to-1 mappings
between domains. This stage could be described as the heart of analogy, as structural
similarity is the guiding force behind the formation of analogies. Typically, analogical
reasoning is divided into a number of successive steps, as follows (from Keane, Ledgeway
and Duff, 1994) :
i) Representation of problem knowledge
ii) Retrieval of required information
iii) Mapping between domains
iv) Transfer of new information
v) Validation of the inter-domain mapping
vi) Induction of new information in target domain
Representation of the appropriate knowledge can be seen as preparing for creativity, and may
include acquiring relevant information about the target domain. Retrieval is similar to
incubation in that we await suitable inspiration by conscious and sub-conscious processes, or
as prompted by external events. Illumination is best described as the phase wherein the new
analogy is specified, which transforms our understanding of the problem domain. This is the
stage during which Kekulé generated the famous analogy between the carbon chain and the
snake with its tail in its mouth. The Illumination phase generates a whole new conceptual
space which can then be explored.
Our computational model of creative reasoning becomes a three stage process (Figure 2). This
separates the purely creative element, from reasoning within the target domain about the new
interpretation. This can be seen as splitting the validation phase in two, the first part validates
the structure of the transferred knowledge, and the second half requires domain specific
expert reasoning within the target domain using the transferred knowledge.
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Figure 2 : The Integrated Model of Analogy
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Clearly creativity is a time consuming process, requiring many iterations through the filtering
mechanism outlined in Figure 2. The output of each iteration is some new interpretation of
the problem domain, but may prove to be one with no discernible advantage over previous
interpretations. However, such apparently fruitless interpretations may ultimately prove useful
by providing the inspiration for a further retrieval episode which delivers an all encompassing
explanation. Thus the "beacon search" mechanism iteratively focuses in on the required
domain description. (as described below).
3.1. Mapping
The most widely analysed phase of analogy is mapping, with most models treating this as the
real core process in analogy. An early and notable model of analogy is SME, the Structure
Mapping Engine (Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner, 1986), which performs a depth-first
search for the optimal set of inter-domain mappings. As with most models, the mapping
phase plays the most important part, with the other phases receiving little attention. SME
validated the importance of systematicity by computationally reproducing some results of
observed human behaviour for a variety of problems. It also helped to highlight the
importance of numerous other factors which also influence the overall process. Falkenhainer
and Oblinger (1990) addressed SME’s computational efficiency problems by including a
pragmatic “hill-climbing” heuristic in the search mechanism.
Holyoak and Thagard’s (1987) Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (ACME) is a neural
network for parallel constraint satisfaction which generates sub-optimal inter-domain
mappings. ACME spawns a new “tumour” of solution nodes for every mapping problem,
disappearing once the solution has been computed. It does however include pragmatic and
other constraints upon the mapping process. Keane, Ledgeway and Duff’s (1994) Incremental
Analogy Machine (IAM) is a more psychologically plausible model of reasoning, reflecting
the way in which inter-domain mappings are compiled incrementally, rather than being
identified in a single operation. A new version of SME called Incremental-SME (I-SME) was
developed (Forbus et al, 1994), growing the inter-domain mapping in an incremental manner.
An important and frequently overlooked constraint upon models of analogy is their
computational feasibility, especially because identifying the optimal inter-domain mapping in
the set of NP-Complete problems (Veale et al, 1996). Any model attempting to find an
optimal solution to an NP-Complete problem, can not be considered a practical and scaleable
problem solving tool. For a comparison of the computational feasibility of SME, ACME and
Sapper, see Veale et al (1995). The Sapper model (Veale, 1997) is a very efficient model for
identifying inter-domain mappings, scaling approximately linearly with problem size. It is a
joint localist-connectionist and symbolic model which uses spreading activation as a basis for
identifying mappings between two concepts stored in an integrated memory. In common with
other sub-optimal algorithms, this is achieved by guaranteeing the systematicity of the final
mapping, but not its optimal size. Sapper highlights the advantage to be gained by the
efficient use of a localist-connection representation.
It should be noted that there are a wide variety of constraints upon the Analogical Reasoning
process which have yet to be modelled in detail. See Holyoak et al (1996) for a
comprehensive list of these factors, although the exact interplay between these constraints
during the problem solving process is anything but clear. This in part, prompted the
development of models like LISA (Hummel and Holyoak, 1996), which focus on the role of
analogy in Induction more than on the mapping problem itself. A great deal of simulation and
analysis will have to be completed to understand the interactions between these factors, and
before any comprehensive model of analogy can emerge
This paper describes a new model of analogical reasoning which attempts to address a
broader range of issues, focusing on mapping but also addressing validation issues. This
model is broadly in line with the Sapper model for metaphor interpretation (Veale, 1997), in
using a localist-connectionist memory model and a symbolic matching component. The inter-
domain mapping is built-up from partial mappings derived from the domain description.
Additionally these description are stored in an integrated store of background knowledge
which includes the domain descriptions. Our model uses this integrated memory as the store
of “hidden” creative analogues, and also as the knowledge structure against which to validate
new creative interpretations.
Mapping the multiple carbon atoms of the simple carbon cluster (Figure 1, in bold) to the
snakes body, we close the loop just as the snake bites its tail. Kekulé’s famous analogy
however does not automatically and uniquely lead to the generation of a ring of 6 Carbon
atoms. The smallest such ring structure is the triangle (Figure 3a) - assuming that the mapping
occurs between the carbon chain and the snakes body, and not between the hydrogen atoms
and the snakes body. However, we are left with a number of inferences in the target domain
which are implicit within this mapping, and which lie contrary to a consistent new
explanatory model of our C6H6 domain. Since Kekulé’s focus was C6H6 not C3H3, Figure 3a
might have scaled up to the construct in Figure 3b, but here too we are left with inferences in
the target domain which contradict our basic requirements (as stored in long term memory).
Validation rejects some source domains (though not all invalid sources can be rejected
without reasoning in the target domain), as transferred knowledge “clashes” with structural
requirements target domain requirements.
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Figure3 : Alternative Interpretations of Kekule's Carbon
Ring
There being little semantic similarity between carbon atoms and a snakes body, creativity
requires a flexible mapping process. We cannot rely on predicate identicality to constrain the
number of mappings which must be entertained, and even predicate similarity may fail to
retrieve useful source domains. Thus the validation stage must assume most of the
responsibility for accepting or rejecting potential sources, preferably rejecting invalid sources
as soon as possible. This factor in particular indicates that Gentner’s predicate identicality
constraint is less significant in creative analogies than those used for learning, description, or
explanation.
3.2. Retrieval
Finding a new interpretation of a given domain will require a great deal of searching, but any
suitably structured source domain can serve the creative need. Previous work in analogue
retrieval has served to highlight the difficulty and computational expense of discovering a
suitable source for any given target. Searching is the driving force behind our model of
creativity, and therefore it will have a definite impact upon the mapping and validation stages.
Thus, we need to examine structure-based searching before proceeding to the latter stages.
Typically in the science domain, there is a notion of what lies within the problem domain,
though its exact boundaries may be unclear. Kekulé for example, knew his problem centred
around the C6H6 molecule. Target domain contents then, can serve as the basis for the creative
search.
Two notable retrieval models are MAC/FAC and ARCS with both operating in a two stage
manner. MAC/FAC "Many Are Called but Few Are Chosen" (Gentner and Forbus, 1991) uses
the identicality constraint as a basis for selecting multiple alternative source domains from an
extensive memory base. These domains are then assessed for structural similarity to the
target, as performed by SME (Falkenhainer, Forbus, and Gentner, 1989). The best domain
identified is selected as the favoured source for the given target analog. ARCS (Thagard et al,
1990) first identifies potential sources using a similarity metric being based on WordNet.
Each identified source is assessed for structural similarity to the target using an ACME
(Holyoak and Thagard, 1989), identifying the largest systematic domain. MAC/FAC and
ARCS employ identicality and similarity-based constraints to reduce the number of potential
source domains to be analysed. Creative reasoning however often relies on between-domains
mappings, lying beyond the scope of identicality and similarity constraints. Creativity would
be better served by a retrieval operation which traverses memory seeking out successively
more distant domains until a suitable source is found.
Case Based Reasoning has also addressed the issue of retrieving semantically distant and
local source domains, given some target description. KDSA Knowledge Directed Spreading
Activation (Wolverton, 1995) system however, has successfully been used to retrieve
semantically distant sources from a case base represented as an integrated semantic network.
This technique relies on a “beacon search” to iteratively traverse the semantic network, each
step identifying a new “beacon” from which searching may proceed. The attractive feature of
KDSA is that not every beacon represents a maximum of the corresponding heuristic
evaluation function enabling the retrieval of semantically distant analogues. KDSA does
retrieve a great many analogues during its search process, each of these being filtered out by a
validation mechanism. Validation also facilitates retrieval by selecting or rejecting a beacon
for the next search. Any creativity model similarly, must expect to retrieve a great many
source domains before a useful one is discovered. Thus, after the retrieval and mapping
stages, we will need to filter out invalid sources as quickly and efficiently as possible.
As pointed out by Johnson-Laird (1989) analogue retrieval is essentially an intractable
problem. In common with approaches to solving NP-complete problems like the Travelling
Salesman Problem, the focus lies on the usefulness of a generated solution and not on the
difficulty with which solutions are found. The aim then is not to create an algorithm which is
guaranteed to produce profound novel analogies within a given time-frame, but to produce
algorithms which are capable of generating a creative product. The problem then becomes an
effort to reduce the potential search space to more manageable proportions.
Using target knowledge lying outside the current interpretation as a basis for search is as
likely to exclude currently understood information as create a useful mapping. Thus we must
rely on at least some domain knowledge to constrain the search space. We may choose to
move between "high level" domains of interpretation to find a novel source, as semantic
distance from the current interpretation is the only quality which can be expected of a novel
interpretation. Many retrieval algorithms lack this ability to retrieve semantically distant
analogues, and thus may have limited applicability within creative retrieval.
Creativity requires finding new interpretations of old data, and accordingly old interpretations
should play no part in this process. Creative search should use as “inspiration” pure target
domain information and not our current interpretation of it, thereby de-conceptualising
(Indurkhya, 1997) the target domain. Standard reasoning benefits greatly from multiple
interpretative analogies supporting multiple manipulations of the problem domain (a triangle
has three sides, or a triangle has three angles, it encloses an area). During creative reasoning
however, dropping these interpretative analogies allows only "pure" problem domain
information to influence the analogical processes. The ability to remove current
interpretations may be easier to model computationally that for humans to achieve, indicating
that computers may have a greater potential for creativity than humans.
The attributes and predicates of a standard chain description for example, should play no part
in determining our new interpretation of C6H6. Thus we should not think of the chain in
Kekulé’s carbon chain, but rather about the carbon and hydrogen atoms and the bonds they
form. Had Kekulé thought of chains, he might never had his snake inspired analogy. Only the
information previously transferred to the problem domain (such as its structure) and all other
same domain data should be involved. Determining domain boundaries and eliminating the
current interpretation of the problem may prove a difficult task in scientific creativity, and
perhaps an impossible one for models of artistic creativity.
As previously stated, numerous source domains could have filled Kekulé’s requirements. For
example tying his trouser belt or fixing a bicycle-chain involves the necessary transition from
open to closed geometric space, or from linear to circular shape. Such domains may be
retrieved by exploring the chain domain or noting that both the carbon chain and trouser belt
ha a number of common features. The resultant mapping might be driven by and based upon
mapping the ends of the carbon chain to the ends of the belt, and the belt notches to the
carbon chain. Then closing the belt becomes attaching the two unused carbon bonds together,
forming a carbon ring with six instead of eight unused carbon bonds. This may then be
completed by allowing multiple bonds exist between two carbon atoms.
Because of the diversity of inspiration which can usefully serve the purpose of creativity,
almost any retrieval mechanism could be usefully employed. However, the use of a “beacon
search” technique allows a greater range to the search, enabling the discovery of semantically
distant analogues. This iterative model of analogue retrieval allows feedback from an
unsuitable source domain to influence succeeding retrieval episodes. Retrieving a non-linear
source domain may not result in the required creative analogy, but may map a larger subset of
target information than linear sources indicating that we are in a potentially more useful
domain than before. Having sufficiently diverse contents within in long term memory
however, may be far more critical than the search mechanism operating on that memory.
3.3. Validation of Transferred Knowledge
The need for validation is rooted in the realisation that not every structural similarity can form
the basis of creative insight. The mere act of seeing something in a new way can be no
guarantee that this new perception will support new and useful inferences. It is even less
likely that the new perception will explain all previously understood knowledge, and
additionally explain any previously inexplicable facts. The problem then is to counteract
increase retrieval flexibility with a mechanism that will readily reject invalid sources,
allowing potentially useful sources to propagate through to later stages of processing. Ideally
we would like to validate each mapping as early as possible avoiding unnecessary reasoning
about the new target interpretation. Validating the mapping itself seems impossible because,
as already stated, we require maximum flexibility in the mapping stage. We require some
other way of rejecting impotent sources, preferably without exploring the entire new
conceptual space.
Structural validation can be achieved in a number of ways, such as validating the retrieval by
ensuring the required structural similarity exists. The n-ary restriction is frequently used as a
basis for restricting the complexity of the mapping process, however the LISA model
(Hummel and Holyoak, 1996) allows n-ary violation (i.e. multiple binary predicates may map
onto a single n-ary predicate -a kind of mental array). In this paper we focus mainly on
ensuring the compositional integrity of predicates, as it is predicate structure which is integral
to analogical reasoning, and thereby to creativity. Our particular interest lies with the
transferred information and its interaction with background knowledge. The earliest identifies
invalid transfers, basing rejection on the fact that they induce structural errors in the target
domain. The latter and more expensive validation requires general reasoning about target
domain knowledge, but the first clearly lies within the realm of analogy and can be performed
relatively inexpensively.
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Using Kekulé’s analogy between the carbon chain and the snake, we could envision the snake
dying and perhaps decaying on the desert floor (perhaps the Hydrogen atoms are mapped to
the desert floor). However, any attempt to transfer a “die” predicate to the chemistry domain
should be trapped as an invalid knowledge transfer (Figure 4). The dying relationship as used
within the knowledge base applies to living things, so the validation mechanism can quickly
reject an attempt to apply this predicate to inappropriate arguments.
We use a similarity based transfer validation mechanism, wherein the transferred knowledge
has to be sufficiently similar to background knowledge for validation. This avoids the
generation of anomalies within the knowledge base, such as the dying Carbon atoms. To
determine whether a transferred predicate is sufficiently similar to previous usage, we use a
simple similarity metric which is relatively inexpensive to compute (Tversky’s, 1977).
Validation is a binary mechanism which ensures that the target domain has sufficient features
to support the transferred predicate as used in the target domain.
F(a    b) > F(a - b) + F(b - a)
A typical source predicate connects two objects, and when transferred will also connect two
target domain objects. Each argument of the predicate must be validated before the
transferred knowledge is added to the target domain. In the previous analogy between the
carbon chain and a dying snake, the predicate “die (Carbon, Hydrogen)” may be available for
transfer. The validation mechanism must ensure that the “die” predicate is not anomalous in
the target domain, by first examining the similarity between carbon and snake, and then the
similarity between hydrogen and desert-floor. A failure to validate any part of the transferred
knowledge causes a failure of the validation mechanism, and a rejection of the inter-domain
mapping.
If no features are available in the target domain the transfer is assumed to be valid. Of course,
real reasoning integrates many different forms of knowledge such as prototypes and rules, but
herein we only use prototype features for validation. This validation mechanism is just one of
a number of levels of validation which are necessary within any such model, but is one which
can be implemented with relative ease and efficiency. It has the added computational
advantage that is reuses the knowledge which has been retrieved from long term memory by
the previous mapping stage, reducing the computational expense of validation.
4. Conclusion
We examine scientific creativity as the search for novel interpretative analogies, which
account for information lying outside the current interpretation. The necessity for a memory
based approach to modelling analogical reasoning is assessed, and we analysed the
requirements placed on analogy by the memory component. We examine a memory
embedded model of analogy encompassing the phases of retrieval, mapping, transfer and
validation. The potential of this, or any other model, to generate a creative output is assessed,
and the requirements placed by it on the underlying analogy mechanism are assessed. Indeed,
computers may be more suited to creativity than humans because an unbiased analogy search
is more practicable for computers, overcoming the human prejudice favouring existing
interpretations.
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